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Abstract
Background: Sugar sweetened beverages (SSB) are a major source of sugar in the diet. Although trends in
consumption vary across regions, in many countries, particularly LMICs, their consumption continues to increase. In
response, a growing number of governments have introduced a tax on SSBs. SSB manufacturers have opposed such
taxes, disputing the role that SSBs play in diet-related diseases and the effectiveness of SSB taxation, and alleging major
economic impacts. Given the importance of evidence to effective regulation of products harmful to human health, we
scrutinised industry submissions to the South African government’s consultation on a proposed SSB tax and examined
their use of evidence.
Results: Corporate submissions were underpinned by several strategies involving the misrepresentation of evidence.
First, references were used in a misleading way, providing false support for key claims. Second, raw data, which
represented a pliable, alternative evidence base to peer reviewed studies, was misused to dispute both the premise of
targeting sugar for special attention and the impact of SSB taxes on SSB consumption. Third, purposively selected
evidence was used in conjunction with other techniques, such as selective quoting from studies and omitting important
qualifying information, to promote an alternative evidential narrative to that supported by the weight of peer-reviewed
research. Fourth, a range of mutually enforcing techniques that inflated the effects of SSB taxation on jobs, public
revenue generation, and gross domestic product, was used to exaggerate the economic impact of the tax. This
“hyperbolic accounting” included rounding up figures in original sources, double counting, and skipping steps in
economic modelling.
Conclusions: Our research raises fundamental questions concerning the bona fides of industry information in the
context of government efforts to combat diet-related diseases. The beverage industry’s claims against SSB taxation rest
on a complex interplay of techniques, that appear to be grounded in evidence, but which do not observe widely
accepted approaches to the use of either scientific or economic evidence. These techniques are similar, but not identical,
to those used by tobacco companies and highlight the problems of introducing evidence-based policies aimed at
managing the market environment for unhealthful commodities.
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Background
Sugar sweetened beverages (SSB) are a major source of
sugar in the diet. Although trends in consumption vary
across regions, in many countries, particularly LMICs, their
consumption continues to increase [1]. In response, a
growing number of governments have introduced a tax on
SSBs as part of broader programmes aimed at reducing
sugar consumption [2]. Proposed policies are typically pro-
ceeded by public consultations, the increasing use of which
reflects a global process of reform that draws heavily on
US administrative law and its cost-benefit approach to
regulatory review and policy formation [3]. This paper
takes a case study-approach to examining corporate actors’
use of evidence in written consultation submissions to the
South African National Treasury’s proposed tax on sugar
sweetened beverages (SSB). Specifically, it explores corpo-
rations’ use of agnogenic practices to shape policy actors’
understanding of the policy and its effects.
By agnogenic practices we refer to methods of represent-
ing, communicating, and producing scientific research and
evidence which work to create ignorance or doubt irre-
spective of the strength of the underlying evidence [4].
Agnogenic methods of research representation and com-
munication by corporations vary considerably, ranging
from discursive practices that demand impossibly high
standards of scientific proof [5, 6] to withholding clinical
trial data [7]. Agnogenic practices relevant to producing
scientific research and evidence are equally diverse and
include devising research protocols that are more likely to
produce desired results [4, 8–10] or simply ensuring that
some research is not undertaken in the first place for fear
of producing unfavourable results. There is now a wealth
of evidence examining the role that corporate actors play
in agnogenesis (the production of information or ideas that
create ignorance or doubt beyond that merited by empir-
ical evidence) [6]. This has primarily centred on corporate
influence in primary scientific research [10–19], systematic
reviews [16, 18, 20–22], and science communication [12,
14, 18, 23–26]. And whilst there is an emerging body of
work on the production of ignorance in the context of state
regulatory agencies [27, 28], agnogenic behaviour by cor-
porate actors in presenting evidence within policy-making
processes is relatively underexplored despite strong busi-
ness dominance in the processes used to collect evidence
which underpin evidence informed policy [29].
In addition, much of the existing literature examining
the interface between corporations and policy- relevant sci-
ence either simply describes industry influence on science
and its communication or demonstrates its effects [10, 23,
30–33], rather than model the discrete techniques corpor-
ate actors use to shape how science and knowledge are
understood. There are some notable exceptions to this [5,
34–39]. However, different methodological approaches and
ontological perspectives taken within this limited literature
have produced what are effectively insular studies that do
not share a common conceptual vocabulary, which is likely
to impede the cross-fertilisation of ideas between scholars
working within different policy contexts. Moreover, exist-
ing studies tend to examine agnogenic practices independ-
ently of one another without exploring how they are
combined to support evidence claims. They also tend to
ignore industry claims relating to economic impacts. Both
of these factors are key to helping policy actors understand
how agnogenesis takes effect and evaluate corporate claims
appropriately. Consequently, we build on existing concep-
tual frameworks of corporate agnogenesis [5, 34] and
develop a synergic, stratified model of industry misuse of
evidence, which takes account of how interdependencies
between different techniques shape evidence-based narra-
tives within corporate submissions. By focusing on South
Africa, we also address the relative dearth of research on
corporations’ use of evidence in health policy in low-and-
middle income countries. After providing a brief overview
of the key claims made within corporate actors’ submis-
sions and the extent to which claims are nominally sup-
ported by evidence, we outline techniques of agnogenesis,
indicating how they interact and support one another. This
is followed by a brief section providing a more detailed ex-
planation of how techniques interlink with and reinforce
one another. In the discussion, we examine the relevance
of these practices for appraising the merits of involving
corporations in health policy-making.
Our selection of SSB taxation as a case study is based on
three observations. First, efforts by governments inter-
nationally to use fiscal levers as a means of addressing rising
levels of type 2 diabetes, obesity, and associated cardiovas-
cular disease have met with fierce industry opposition [40,
41]. This opposition is consistent with (and potentially
prompted by) strong evidence that SSB taxation reduces
SSB consumption [42, 43], some evidence that it may also
drive reductions in sales of diet drinks [44–46], and emer-
ging findings that some substitution effects may be
captured by other market actors (as in the case of milk or
coffee) or are not so readily commodified (as in the case of
water) [47, 48]. That this combination of effects is likely to
reduce sales and corporate earnings significantly increases
the incentives for corporate actors to engage in what Par-
khurst has termed “strategic technical bias” (questionable
uses of evidence that depart from scientific best practice)
[35, 36, 49]. Second, evidence linking SSB consumption to
obesity and elevated risk of metabolic and cardiovascular
diseases is voluminous, growing, and methodologically di-
verse [50–52]. Combined with the fact that diet-related dis-
eases have complex aetiologies, and that, historically,
evidence linking SSB taxes to weight loss has been mixed
[53–55], this increases the opportunities for corporate
actors to engage in strategic technical bias. Third, evidence
of the economic, substitution, and complementarity effects
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of SSB taxation is emerging rather than settled [47], which
raises additional sources of uncertainty and, therefore,
opportunities for technical biases. The study represents the
first systematic, critical examination of policy-facing re-
search communication by corporations beyond the UK and
presents the first synergic model of corporate agnogenesis.
Method
Data collation
A desk based approach was taken to collating written re-
sponses to the South African National Treasury’s policy
paper on a taxation of sugar sweetened beverages [56, 57]
by corporate actors (hereafter industry submissions), which
we defined to include: companies in the food and drink
sector and SSB supply chain and the business associations
that represent them; professional service firms with food
and drink sector clients and the professional associations
that represent them. Submissions are not collated in a sin-
gle publicly accessible website and so were obtained
through a mix of requests to public officials involved in the
consultations, Google searches of respondents’ web-sites
(search string - “respondent’s site”:(url) “sugar levy” OR
“sugar tax” OR “industry levy” OR [tax AND “sugar sweet-
ened beverages”] OR [tax AND “soft drinks”] OR [levy
AND “sugar sweetened beverages”] OR [levy AND “soft
drinks”]) and email requests to respondents. Of the five
submissions obtained via this process, two were excluded
for in-depth review as they did not cite evidence. This left
three submissions for close analysis, those of: the American
Chamber of Commerce South Africa (AmCham SA), the
Beverage Association of South Africa (BEVSA), the peak
industry association for South African based SSB manufac-
turers, and Coca-Cola, the company which arguably stood
to lose most from the tax. In addition, we undertook an in-
depth critical appraisal of an industry commissioned report
by Oxford Economics [58], which was cited at length in
BEVSA’s and Coca-Cola’s submission.
We used several methods to collate evidence cited in the
submissions and Oxford Economics report. Peer-reviewed
research was identified via Web of Science and PubMed
Central. Searches of authors’ institutional web-sites were
used to identify research consultant, company, and (non-
peer reviewed) academic reports. Where this proved un-
successful, we performed general internet searches using
the search engine Google and requested copies from au-
thors via email. The same protocol was used where the
cited (primary) source was not the ultimate (secondary)
source of the evidence claimed in the submission reviewed
(see Results). Peer-reviewed research articles on the effects
of SSB taxation on consumer behaviour based on calcula-
tions of cross-price elasticities were collated to strengthen
our evaluation of Oxford Economics’ modelling. These
were identified using relevant search terms via Web of
Science and PubMed Central and by hand searches of
reference lists of studies identified as relevant (see Add-
itional file 1: Table S1). Finally, we contacted (via-email)
authors of studies and reports cited in evidence and ana-
lysed in depth (n = 3) to seek clarification of specific points,
but received no replies.
Data analysis
We undertook three analyses. First, we performed a source
analysis of industry submissions, which involved: identify-
ing policy relevant propositions within submissions (execu-
tive summaries and introductory sections were excluded);
assessing whether propositions were substantiated with ref-
erence to an ostensibly validating source; classifying the
type (e.g. method of funding and publication) and availabil-
ity of the source. We defined “relevant propositions” as
statements or assertions that expressed an anticipated ef-
fect of, or judgement of fact supportive of an anticipated
effect of, the policy beyond the intended direct effects of
SSB taxation (encouraging a substantive decline in
consumption of SSBs), but excluding assertions relating to
the industry’s pre-levy contribution to the economy, such
as employment associated with the non-alcoholic beverage
industry. Evidence availability was examined by transposing
the search strategies used to collate the evidence (outlined
above) into thematic codes. Where evidence was obtained
directly from authors we used a web-archiving tool
(https://archive.org/web) to determine availability at both
the time of publication and immediately after the deadline
for consultation submissions. A sub-sample (10%) of the
results of this analysis was coded by SW. Disagreements
over differences in coding were resolved through discus-
sion and consensus.
The second method of analysis combined a verification-
oriented cross-documentary analysis with an interpretative
analysis used to identify conceptual themes and explore
interconnections between different techniques. This used
a backward mapping strategy to compare references made
to evidence (where cited) with their supporting sources to
examine how they had been used. Where the supporting
(primary) source was not the original source of evidence
for the proposition, we applied the same approach to the
underlying (secondary) source. The results of this process
were thematically analysed (by GF) using the techniques
of constructivist grounded theory [59, 60]: systematic con-
ceptual coding (using Nvivo software); constant compari-
son; discourse sensitivity; attention to divergent data;
conceptual conclusions. A hybrid approach (part inductive
and emergent and part deductive) [61] was taken to cod-
ing. To this end, our analysis was informed by four litera-
tures: social constructivist perspectives of science [62, 63],
which work on the premise that facts are socially and
interactionally constructed and open to alternative inter-
pretations; studies on the (mis) use of science by corpora-
tions [5, 12, 64]; the literature on logical fallacies [65]; and
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studies on evidence synthesis and weight of evidence ana-
lyses [66, 67]. The micro (first level) themes (described as
techniques in the analysis) were grouped under broader
categories (which we describe as practices) and (where
relevant) synthesised with conceptual categories used in
the existing literature [5]. Emerging ideas were discussed
by the wider team at interim analytic meetings. A sub-
sample of the material (10%) was coded by two other
researchers (SW, GB). Disagreements over differences in
coding were resolved through discussion and consensus.
Third, the critical appraisal of Oxford Economics’ report
[58] was undertaken by evaluating assumptions, data
sources, information uncertainties, and unquantified/quan-
tified costs and benefits within economic models using the
backward mapping approach outlined above [68]. The re-




Industry submissions set out a metanarrative of “policy
dystopia” [69]. Predicated on accumulating anticipated “so-
cial bads”, this stressed the policy would cause widely dis-
persed adverse social and economic consequences and fail
on its own (public health) terms. Among other things, cor-
porate actors claimed that the tax would: trigger tens of
thousands of job losses concentrated in small-scale farms
and spazas (informal convenience stores usually run from
home) and reduce employment growth; exacerbate the
broader fiscal and societal costs associated with unemploy-
ment (by, for example, reducing the overall tax take); dam-
age the competitiveness of the non-alcoholic beverage
industry; undermine South Africa’s National Development
Plan (specifically its aim to increase economic growth,
eliminate poverty, and increase employment); trigger busi-
ness failures across the supply chain; lead to reduced
revenue for farmers; dissuade international investors from
investing in South Africa; increase the risk of a credit
downgrade; disproportionately fall on lower-income house-
holds; and have a negligible impact on population health.
Claims that SSB would not measurably improve health
outcomes were based on three supporting propositions:
first, because SSBs constituted a small proportion (3%) of
energy intake in South Africa any decline in SSB consump-
tion was unlikely to significantly reduce obesity; second,
consumption of sugar within South Africa was declin-
ing and, therefore, not a key driver of the country’s
increasing obesity rate; and, third that consumers
would simply substitute SSB consumption with other
energy-dense products [70–72].
Summarised explanations of the agnogenic practices
and techniques used to support this dystopic narrative
are outlined in Table 1 immediately below. Where tech-
niques work to similar effects (e.g. false attribution of
focus and selective quotation) or are linked by a common
theme (e.g. cryptic references and faux sources) we group
them together under related practices (i.e. misleading
summaries and and confounding references.). We go on
to discuss our results under two meta-practices: mim-
icked scientific reasoning and hyperbolic accounting. We
use the term mimicked scientific reasoning to describe
practices and techniques that misrepresent, and work to
circumvent, the weight of evidence concerning the ef-
fects of SSBs and SSB taxes on obesity and diet-related
diseases, including, for instance, misrepresenting the
focus and objectives of studies and omitting important
qualifying information. Scientific reasoning is mimicked
in the sense that evidence use and appraisal appears, on
the face of it, to take an unprejudiced, evidence-in-
formed assessment of the relevant science. In practice,
however, the approach fails to observe accepted princi-
ples of deductive and inductive reasoning, does not ob-
serve accepted conventions associated with how to
accurately support evidence-based claims, and does not
appropriately take into account weight or strength of
evidence approaches to evidence appraisal. Hyperbolic
Accounting, by comparison, encompasses techniques and
practices that exaggerate the stated economic impact of
proposed policies (on employment, public revenue gen-
eration, and gross domestic product), such as failing to
fully articulate key steps in economic modelling (synco-
pated estimation) or counting economic impacts more
than once (double counting). Although we deal with
these meta-practices separately for ease of understand-
ing, in practice, agnogenic techniques cut across efforts
to misrepresent the weight of evidence concerning the
effects of SSBs and SSB taxes on obesity and diet-related
diseases and exaggerate the economic impacts of SSB
taxes (see Fig. 1).
Mimicked scientific reasoning
Confounding referencing
Industry submissions took a misleading approach to
referencing sources. Techniques such as source launder-
ing (providing secondary sources to mask the use of
industry data) and faux sources (falsely attributing data
to a cited source, AmCham SA only) gave a misleading
impression of the breadth of sources and evidence sup-
porting claims (see also out-of-place citations, discussed
under Misleading Summaries below).
Source laundering (Table 1) AmCham SA referenced a
2013 report jointly produced by Oxford Economics and
the International Tax and Investment Center (hereafter the
2013 Oxford Economics report) [73] to support the claim
that Denmark had abolished their “fat … and sugar tax”, in
part, due to cross-border shopping [71]. Oxford Econom-
ics’ comments on cross-border shopping in Denmark drew
exclusively from a Danish Food and Drink Federation (DI
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• The misleading use of references which either overstates or gives an entirely
false impression of support for a claim or obstructs evidence appraisal.
Cryptic references • An opaque reference that provides insufficient information to easily locate the
original source and which serves to obstruct evidence appraisal.
Faux sources / False authority • A faux source involves providing an incorrect source for key data. The concept
overlaps with an appeal to a false authority, where an alleged authority is used
as evidence to support a claim, which, in fact, is not an authority on the facts
relevant to the claim.
Out-of-place citations • References that give a false impression of support for a proposition as a result
of being misplaced in the text. These take various forms and can be used to
validate illicit generalisations or simply provide a faux source for a key proposition.
Vapid out-of-place citations • A hybrid confounding reference (combining an out-of-place citation and a faux
source) which contains relatively useless contextual information that fails to
support, and has no direct relevance, to the claim in the text.
Source laundering • Provision of a relatively independent source which obscures the use of industry
data as the underlying support for the proposition.
Inaccessible source • The use of a source that is not publicly available.
Misleading Summaries • Inaccurate reporting of objectives, findings, and conclusions of sources.
Absence of evidence as
evidence of absence
• A logical fallacy aimed at representing a relationship that has not been satisfactorily
explored as evidence that no relationship exists (usually used in combination with
other techniques, such as omission of qualifying information).
False attribution of focus • Misrepresentation of the focus of studies.
Omission of important
qualifying information
• A specific variant of strategic ignorance characterised by precise but inaccurate
reporting of study findings in which important qualifying information that
significantly changes the implications of the findings is omitted.
Selective quotation • Reporting extracts either out of context or by omitting qualifying information to
give a misleading impression of either the study quoted or the research
upon which it is based.
Simple misstatement of
key/study findings
• Erroneously and unambiguously claiming that a study has produced a specific finding.
‘The Tweezers Method’ • The practice of picking phrases out of context from peer-reviewed studies with
the effect of changing the emphasis and/or intended meaning of the original text.
Acalculiac rounding-up • Rounding-up estimates without cause or explanation.
Double-counting • Counting an economic impact (or part of an impact) more than once.
Illicit Generalisation • A logical fallacy where the underlying evidence is insufficiently developed to
support an inductive generalisation.
Evidential
Landscaping
• Either promoting alternative evidence (a parallel evidence base) to shift the
evidential basis upon which the policy is being discussed and evaluated or
purposefully excluding relevant evidence
Data dredging (misuse
of raw data)
• Presenting and/or analysing data to depict relationships or trends that either
misrepresent actual relationships or obscure other contradictory relationships
and/or trends in the data.
Unmodelled data (misuse
of raw data)
• Homespun trend analysis summarising patterns across time that ignores key
confounding variables or pre-existing/underlying trends. In this latter sense,
unmodelled data may involve a faux counterfactual, where the impact of an
intervention is not appropriately explored by comparing the world in which
the intervention occurred with the world in which it did not.
Observational Selection/Cherry-
Picking
• The practice of highlighting individual studies or data to support a pre-determined
conclusion, whilst ignoring contradictory (and typically stronger) evidence.
The ‘Hens’ teeth’ technique • An egregious form of cherry-picking that involves foregrounding obscure, outlying
studies.
Passé Source • Cherry-picking an older source to support an assumption, which although fairly
reflecting the state of scientific knowledge when published has since been
superseded by developments in the evidence-base.
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Fødevarer) factsheet on the tax on saturated fat in
Denmark [74]; and a EURACTIV report of a survey by the
Danish Grocers’ Trade Organisation [75] (also see Informa-
tion Asymmetries below). By creating an additional step in
the process of assessing the methodology of original
sources and verifying that their findings have been accur-
ately reported, the technique complicated the process of
evidence appraisal. In the present case, Oxford Economics’
2013 report had cited the DI Fødevarer factsheet to sup-
port the contention that a Danish family could save at least
US$455 (EUR350) a year by shopping in Germany, despite
the factsheet containing no such claim (see faux source
below and Table 1) [74]. In addition, Oxford Economics
had noted that the change in shopping habits outlined in
the EURACTIV report related to “beverages”; the natural
implication being that this applied exclusively to non-alco-
holic beverages [73]. In fact, the EURACTIV report noted
clearly that the survey results referred to purchasing behav-
iour for soft drinks and beer combined and that the Danish
government had introduced higher taxes on beer
(amongst other things) in the January of the year the
survey was conducted (which, all things being equal,
Table 1 Agnogenic practices and techniques by soft drink manufacturers in the consultation on South Africa’s proposed sugar-
sweetened beverages policy (Continued)
Practices Techniques Description
Strategic ignorance • The technique of ignoring findings and evidence-backed observations in
cited sources that contradict unsupported or weakly supported claims.
Syncopated
Estimation
• Missing or failing to fully articulate key steps in economic modelling (including,
but not limited to, the failure to: provide a range of estimates to reflect uncertainties
in assumptions; fairly review the literature relevant to specifying assumptions; provide
a clear and comprehensive assessment of assumptions).
Black-box Computation
(information asymmetries)
• Opaque, unverifiable steps in economic modelling.
Inaccessible Data (information
asymmetries)
• The reliance on privately held data in economic assessments.
Fig. 1 Model of Corporate Agnogenesis of Soft Drink Companies in the context of South Africa’s Consultation on a Proposed Taxation on
Sugar-Sweetened Beverages
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was likely to have increased the demand for cross-
border shopping in respect of alcoholic beverages)
[75].
Faux Sources (Table 1) The importance of transpar-
ency in citing sources is underlined where laundering in-
volves faux sources (falsely attributing data to a cited
source) (see also Cryptic References below). AmCham SA
reported that SSB taxation was “blamed for the loss of 1,
300 jobs as Danish shoppers migrated to purchasing
their preferred soft drinks in Germany and Sweden” [71]
citing the 2013 Oxford Economics’ report [73] in sup-
port. In practice, the report did not give a figure for job
losses and only noted the “detrimental impact of intro-
ducing an SFBT on jobs and investment, its influence on
transborder purchasing, alongside the administrative
costs it imposes on companies” [73]. However, an almost
identically worded claim relating to Denmark’s saturated
fat excise duty was made in an article in The Spectator
magazine [76] which was also cited by AmCham SA. A
supporting reference is not provided in the article. How-
ever, it appears to draw on a discussion piece on Den-
mark’s tax on saturated fat published by Christopher
Snowdon of the Institute of Economic Affairs (UK) [77],
an occasional contributor to the magazine, which makes
an identical claim citing a commentary in a Danish on-
line newspaper, written by the head of Dansk Erhverv
(the Danish Chamber of Commerce) and managing dir-
ector of Landbrug & Fødevarer (the Danish Agricultural
& Food Council). The commentary simply states, with-
out reference to a data source or method of calculation,
that, “according to our calculations, the fat tax alone has
cost 1,300 jobs” (emphasis added) [78].
Misleading summaries
Submissions used several techniques that centred on in-
accurately reporting objectives, findings, and conclusions
of sources. These ranged from relatively simple cases of
misstating key findings to omitting important qualifying
information and the tweezers method [5] of picking
phrases out of context, thereby changing the emphasis and
intended meaning of the original text. The effect of these
techniques was to transform evidence that contradicted,
weakly supported or provided no support for the industry’s
case into evidence that was stated to be strongly and
unambiguously supportive.
One technique, used relatively heavily by AmCham SA,
involved the simple misstatement of key findings. AmCham
SA, for instance, noted that, “negative externalities and in-
creased administrative costs, job losses, higher food prices,
lower profitability for firms … were found in a study of
Finland, France, the Netherlands and Hungary on food
taxes” [71] led by Ecorys, a European based research and
consultancy firm (hereafter Ecorys’ study or Ecorys’ report)
[79]. The only explicit reference to negative externalities in
Ecorys’ report related to consumer externalities (i.e. the
costs to society not already factored into the price of the
taxed products) that the taxes were designed to address
[79]. On job losses Ecorys reported increases in employ-
ment in the year following the first tax increase on confec-
tionery and chocolate in Denmark and Finland, no change
in trend after the introduction of France’s tax on regular
cola, and an end to employment growth following Finland’s
tax increase on soft drinks. Only in the case of Hungary
was the trend data consistent with AmCham’s claim. Even
here, however, the report noted that employment increased
following the introduction of taxes on SSB and energy
drinks (but declined in the year following increases in the
tax) [79] (see also under Hyperbolic Accounting).
Not all inaccurate reporting was so flagrant. In other
cases, study results were accurately reported, but im-
portant qualifying information was omitted (omission of
qualifying information). BEVSA (and Coca-Cola), for ex-
ample, reported that, “even in Mexico, the SSB tax only
reduced daily consumption of soft drinks by 17 kJ (4
Calories) per day– less than 0.2% of daily energy intake”,
citing a study using Mexican sales data by Colchero, et
al [42]. This accurately reflected their finding that pur-
chases of taxed SSBs decreased by an average of 6% (−
12mL/capita/day) in 2014. However, BEVSA (and Coca-
Cola) failed to add that Colchero et al had found that
decreases had grown progressively through 2014 as the
tax took effect, reaching a 12% decline by December
2014 compared to pre-tax trends, even though this was
reported prominently in the paper’s abstract.
In some cases, the omission of qualifying information
was key to misrepresenting the focus and objectives of
studies (false attribution of focus), which in its weaker form
provided a platform to present absence of evidence as evi-
dence of absence. AmCham SA, for instance, reported that
the Ecorys’ study had found “no discernible improvement
to public health” [71]. The study’s objective, outlined in the
introduction to the report, was “to conduct a detailed ana-
lysis of the impact of food taxes on competitiveness in the
agri-food sector” [79]. Although one of the questions ex-
plored by Ecorys involved, “what qualitative and quantita-
tive results support a public health or fiscal objective”, the
report noted that the study had “not focused on public
health implications as a primary objective” [79]. Conse-
quently, Ecorys gave little attention to health effects in their
report, which were examined by way of a brief, unstruc-
tured review of public health research. On the back of this
review, Ecorys observed that the extent to which food taxes
lead to improvements in health was “still widely debated”
and that “evidence from academic literature [was] still
inconclusive and sometimes contradictory” [79]. It went on
to report that, “the key reasons for the diversity in results
of studies are the uncertainties around product substitution
and the calculation methods used to translate consumption
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changes into particular health effects” and concluded that
these issues could only be explored in depth once longer
term health data had become available [79]. In its stronger
form, false attribution of focus involved mobilising what
was essentially a faux source to the same effect. AmC-
ham SA, for instance, cited the 2013 Oxford Economics
report [73] to support the claim that the impact of
“SSBs on health outcomes is uncertain and unproven”
[71], when the report did not examine the relationship
between SSBs and health.
Out-of-place citations, a form of confounding referencing,
gave a false impression of support for a key proposition
(or propositions) because of how they were placed in the
text. They were one of three techniques used to side-step
the literature on substitution effects (see also cherry pick-
ing to support illicit generalisations and strategic ignor-
ance), which although not entirely consistent, and still
developing [47], indicated that switching to other products
in response to increased SSB prices would only marginally
offset energy reductions achieved through decreased SSB
consumption [42, 44, 46, 48, 80–87].
Vapid out-of-place citations involved providing a refer-
ence next to major claims concerning substitution ef-
fects that only contained contextual information, and
not the substantiating evidence its position in the text
implied. In the first extract from AmCham SA’s submis-
sion outlined in Table 2 (A1) [71], for example, the
source (#3) refers to the 2014 edition of Pricewaterhou-
seCoopers’ Worldwide Tax Summaries [88]. The natural
inference of the reference given its position immediately
after “Denmark” was that it constituted evidence of the
substitution effects alleged. In practice, however, Price-
waterhouseCoopers’ Worldwide Tax Summaries provide
basic details about tax systems for countries worldwide:
as such, the reference constituted a faux source that sim-
ply provided descriptive information about the tax,
which we summarise under A2 in Table 2.
Out-of-place citations were also used to validate
illicit generalisations (see Table 1). In the present case
this involved providing a reference for an evidentially
weak exemplification of a general claim that con-
sumers would switch to other energy dense products.
This is illustrated in the second extract (B) in Table
2 taken from Coca-Cola’s submission (also repro-
duced in BEVSA’s submission). Rather than review
the evidence on substitution effects or cite a source
to this effect, Coca-Cola simply provided a reference
(#20) to support the exemplification. This appears to
refer to an unpublished conference presentation by
Hanks et al 2012 [89], which, in August 2016 (the
completion date of the submission), was only one of
four studies that had considered alcohol as a substi-
tute and the only one to have found a positive associ-
ation [45, 82, 90, 91] (see the Hen’s Teeth technique
below). Moreover, a summary of a subsequent version
of the presentation, published in The Journal of
Nutrition Education and Behavior, provided no
indication of the proportion of, or extent to which,
consumers substituted to alcohol [91].
The tweezers method [5] was also used to conflate ab-
sence of evidence with evidence of absence. For example,
Coca-Cola reported that a recent review by Malik and
Hu (2015) had “concluded that there is limited evidence
that consumers do not reduce their Calorie intake to off-
set Calories consumed in liquid form” [70]. These com-
ments were designed to take issue with claims that SSBs
have lower satiety and that consumers do not entirely
offset liquid calories by reducing energy intake fully at
subsequent meals [92]. The natural inference to be
drawn from them was that studies exploring this poten-
tial effect had found limited evidence of its existence,
when, in fact, Malik and Hu had used “limited evidence”
to highlight the dearth of studies on the issue and con-
cluded that the findings of this limited evidence-base
were consistent with the argument that sugar or high
fructose corn syrup (used to sweeten SSBs in the US) in
liquid beverages may not suppress intake of solid foods
to the level needed to maintain energy balance [93].
Evidential landscaping
In the most general sense evidential landscaping
involves changing the evidential landscape upon which a
policy is being discussed and evaluated. Ulucanlar et al
[5] use the concept to encompass both the promotion of
different types of evidence (a parallel evidence base) and
Table 2 Out-of-Place Citations
A1) Text from submission of American Chamber of Commerce in
South Africa [71]
Consumers could substitute their soft drink choices with cheaper
products and this behavioural change may undermine the impact
of a sugar tax in terms of both health and revenue objectives. This
was proven in Hungary and Denmark [3] when consumers made the
following choices once a sugar tax was introduced which made their
soft drink of choice too expensive:
• They purchased and consumed lower-cost versions of the same
product;
• They purchased untaxed products with similar nutritional
characteristics thereby preventing the goal of obesity reduction
being reached; and
• They purchased the same item from somewhere cheaper often
resorting to trans-border purchasing which resulted in a lack of
related revenue to that country’s fiscus.
A2) Text from PricewaterhouseCoopers’ 2014 Worldwide Tax
Summaries cited as footnote 3 immediately above [88]
The first domestic distributor of certain products, as well as the acquirer
of goods that are brought from abroad and used for the domestic
manufacture of own products that will be sold in Hungary, are liable to
pay a product tax. The duty rates from 1 January 2014 are as follows:
[text goes on to list commodities that attract the tax]
B) Text from submission of Coca-Cola [70]
“Moreover, consumers typically substitute SSBs with other Calorie dense
products, such as alcohol [20].”
Fooks et al. Globalization and Health           (2019) 15:56 Page 8 of 20
the process of purposefully excluding relevant data or
research. We take the first, positive, limb of evidential
landscaping to describe the mobilisation of qualitatively
different types of evidence or data to that driving the
thinking of science on a contested issue and split the
exclusion of evidence into two parts: cherry-picking (or
observational selection), which has the effect of ignoring
(excluding) evidence which does not support a pre-de-
termined conclusion (see below and Table 1); and stra-
tegic ignorance, which describes the practice of over-
looking findings and evidence-backed observations in
cited sources (see below and Table 1).
Misuse of raw data Submissions drew heavily on raw
data, which presented a pliable, alternative evidence base
(see Table 1) to peer reviewed studies and systematic re-
views that broadly suggested a positive correlation between
SSBs, obesity and disease [52, 93] and a negative correl-
ation between SSB taxation and weight gain/obesity [94].
One approach involved disputing the premise of targeting
sugar for special attention by focusing on trends in sugar
consumption relative to other foods. Both Coca-Cola and
BEVSA argued that SBBs constituted just 3% of average
daily energy intake against a backdrop of declining con-
sumption of added sugar: 46 kcal between 1991 and 2011.
Increases in other energy dense foods, such as vegetable
oils (105 kcal) and cereals (51 kcal), were claimed to ac-
count for the rise in average daily energy intake (191 kcal)
over the period. To support the point each submission
simply cited the “Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations” (FAO) [70, 72]. Notwithstanding the
cryptic nature of the reference (Table 1), the statement ap-
pears to draw on FAO Food Balance sheets, which do in-
deed report that per capita daily supply of sugar (raw
equivalent) declined from 346 kcal in 1991 to 300 kcal in
2011 (Table 3). However, a closer inspection of the data
indicates that it had been dredged to fit the narrative [95,
96] (see Table 1). In the 23-year period preceding 2013,
the most recent year FAO data had been available to
Coca-Cola, per capita daily supply of sugar for 1991 is the
highest reported by the FAO (see Table 4). 2011 (8th low-
est reported) appears to have been taken as a cut-off be-
cause of the relatively steep-rise in reported sugar supply
thereafter (2013 is the joint 5th highest). The effect of this
can be illustrated by focusing on the 20-year (1994–2013)
and 10-year (2004–2013) periods up to and including
2013. In the first scenario, FAO data indicate that sugar
supply has still increased, but by just 17 kcal (decreases of
89 kcal and 40 kcal for vegetable oils and cereals respect-
ively). However, in the second scenario, FAO data indicate
that sugar supply has, in fact, increased by 38 kcal (de-
creases of 18 kcal and 47 kcal for vegetable oils and cereals
respectively) (see Table 3).
Another approach involved using unmodelled data
and a faux counterfactual to question the effect of SSB
taxation on purchases. AmCham SA, for instance,
focused on the gross revenue generated by Mexico’s SSB
tax, noting that, “the tax [had] delivered 50% more
revenue in 2014 than budgeted” and that “it further
increased in 2015 as sugar sweetened soft drinks grew in
volume (which indicates a bounce back from consump-
tion decrease)” [71]. The underlying claim contradicts
peer-reviewed studies exploring the impact of the tax
which arrive at the opposite conclusion, partly by taking
per capita measurements and adjusting for macroeco-
nomic variables that affect beverage purchases over time,
but also by selecting a logical counterfactual and focus-
ing on changes in sales relative to trend (i.e. comparing
volumes of taxed purchases following the introduction
of tax with estimated volumes that would have been pur-
chased based on pre-tax trends) [42, 43].
Table 3 Food and Agriculture Organization Balance Sheets
(Food Supply, Select Items)







1991 346 228 1495
1992 336 222 1498
1993 330 217 1592
1994 327 248 1549
1995 319 261 1526
1996 317 257 1526
1997 318 283 1503
1998 317 305 1556
1999 314 285 1547
2000 309 276 1594
2001 303 315 1595
2002 296 348 1579
2003 305 344 1573
2004 281 329 1585
2005 279 335 1590
2006 279 324 1538
2007 279 299 1529
2008 269 319 1493
2009 271 357 1481
2010 301 360 1532
2011 300 332 1546
2012 307 328 1527
2013 319 311 1538
aOil crops (other), groundnut oil, sunflower oil, cottonseed oil, palm kernel oil,
bWheat and products, rice (milled equivalent), barley and products, maize and
products, rye and products, oats, millet and products, sorghum and products,
cereals (other)
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Observational selection (cherry-picking)
The concept of cherry picking (or, more formally, obser-
vational selection) is widely used in the literature as a
blanket term to describe a broad range of practices in
which individual studies or data are highlighted to sup-
port a pre-determined conclusion, whilst contradictory
(and typically stronger) evidence is ignored [11, 35, 36,
99–101]. One advantage of this undifferentiated use of
the term is that it highlights the pervasiveness of the
practice. However, it can overlook considerable invent-
iveness in evidence selection and obscure how the prac-
tice is combined with other agnogenic techniques (see
also the discussion of false attribution of focus above),
which is key to their agnogenic potential.
The conference presentation by Hanks, et al (2013)
cited by BEVSA and Coca-Cola (see Out-of-Place cita-
tions above), for instance, represents an example of the
hen’s teeth technique: an obscure, outlying study cited to
support industry claims-making around substitution
effects (see Table 1). Moreover, it also exemplifies the
close relationship between cherry picking and illicit
generalisations: Coca-Cola (and BEVSA) having made a
population level claim suggesting that consumers substi-
tute to other calorie dense products on the back of a
focused, underpowered study. Equally, AmCham SA’s
use of the 2013 Oxford Economics report [73] to ques-
tion the evidence on the relationship between SSBs and
health (see above) highlights the value of cherry picking
inaccessible sources (the report was not publicly available
at the time of writing and had never been made publicly
available via either the International Tax and Investment
Center or Oxford Economics websites since publication),
which compromises evidence appraisal.
The above examples illustrate a relatively uncompli-
cated, binary combination of agnogenic techniques. In
practice, however, cherry-picking was combined in more
subtle and complex ways with other techniques to amplify
the significance of the relatively limited evidence-base
challenging the effectiveness of SSB taxation (evidential
landscaping – see Table 1). This is illustrated by Coca-Co-
la’s (and BEVSA’s) use of two studies by Fletcher, Frisvold
and Tefft [97, 98] outlined in Table 4 below.
The first quote from the extract (A1) is taken from their
2010 examination of the effects of soft drink taxes in the
US on child and adolescent soft drink consumption, substi-
tution patterns, and weight outcomes. In the original the
quoted text summarises the study’s results, but is used in
Coca-Cola’s submission to imply that “several studies” had
been reviewed (selective quotation and illicit generalisation)
[90]. Moreover, the relevance of Fletcher, at al’s 2010 study
to South Africa’s proposed SSB tax is unclear given that,
historically, US tax rates have been significantly lower than
that proposed by the South African Treasury. Fletcher, et al
explicitly caution against extrapolating their results to large
increases in tax rates (see A2 in Table 4), but this important
qualification to their main finding, which immediately fol-
lows the extracted quote, is omitted (omission of qualifying
information, see also strategic ignorance below).
The second quote is taken from a subsequent 2015 study
by Fletcher, et al which specifically seeks to address the
weaknesses noted in their earlier study by examining the
weight trajectory of Ohio and Arkansas residents following
large soda tax increases compared with individuals in other
control states [98]. The study is well-designed and the
quote fairly reflects the authors’ thoughts on the implica-
tions of their findings, but, once again, is limited to the
study’s results rather than the “several studies” noted in the
preceding sentence (selective quotation and illicit general-
isation). In short, the agnogenic potential of cherry-picking,
at least in this context, does not reside solely in which evi-
dence is selected and which is ignored, although this is sig-
nificant. Equally important is how cherry-picked evidence is
subsequently dissembled, stripped of its context and qualifi-
cations, stitched back together and reframed.
Strategic ignorance
This inventive, unscientific use of research works to
side-step a balanced consideration of the weight of evi-
dence exploring the effects of SSB taxation on weight
gain and obesity [94] and is symptomatic of an otherwise
insoluble dilemma facing corporate actors: how to lever-
age the legitimacy of peer-review to support a strong
dystopic position, where evidence is either emerging and
uncertain, or simply contradicts their favoured claim
[94]. In practice, strategic ignorance (Table 1) is key to
resolving this dilemma. McGoey defines strategic ignor-
ance as the “deliberate insulation from unsettling infor-
mation” [28]. Whilst this broad definition has the
Table 4 Cherry-Picking (Observational Selection)
A1) Text from Coca-Cola South Africa [70]
Several studies of observed market outcomes from SSB taxes in the US have found no impact on obesity rates. These studies conclude that “any
reduction in soft drink consumption has been offset by the consumption of other Calories” [97] .” Their findings “cast serious doubt on the
assumptions that proponents of large soda taxes make on its likely impacts on population weight [98].”
A2) Text from Fletcher, et al, 2010 [97]
“Despite this evidence against the effectiveness of soft drink taxes to reduce obesity, we believe that there are at least two directions for further
inquiry in this area. First, although there is no evidence that soft drink taxes improve weight outcomes in children and adolescents, the fact that
children and adolescents substitute more nutritious whole milk for soft drinks when taxed suggests that there may be broader health benefits that
are not yet understood. Second, most historical tax rates are considerably lower than those that have been recently proposed, so that extrapolating
our results to much larger increases in tax rates may not be appropriate.”
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advantage of highlighting corporate actors’ systematic
tendency to ignore inconvenient evidence, it overlaps
with evidential landscaping and fails to demarcate dif-
ferent modes of evidential exclusion. We use it in this
context to describe the mixed practice of overlooking
findings and evidence-backed observations in cited
sources that work against dystopic claims-making. It is
clearly apparent in the omission of qualifying informa-
tion (see the discussion of Fletcher, et al immediately
above), but also appears elemental in the industry’s ef-
forts to piece together a coherent narrative (through
observational selection/cherry-picking) from a body of
knowledge largely unsympathetic to their dystopic
narrative.
Coca-Cola and BEVSA, for example, ignored Malik and
Hu’s (see above in relation to The Tweezer’s method) ob-
servation that “a majority of but not all systematic reviews
had reported positive associations between SSB and weight
gain or risk of overweight or obesity” [93], which under-
mined their efforts to raise doubts about the impact of
SSBs on weight gain. Both corporate actors also overlooked
their observation that SSBs had “been identified as a suit-
able target for public health interventions” because they
“provide [d] “empty” calories and almost no nutritional
value” [93], which countered their complaints that SSBs
had being unfairly singled out for policy intervention.
Equally, both submissions focused exclusively on the rela-
tionship between SSBs, weight gain, and obesity, ignoring
strong evidence associating SSB consumption with ele-
vated risk of type 2 diabetes [51, 102] even though this was
explored at length by Malik and Hu. In fact, no mention is
made of diabetes in either submission. Coca-Cola and
BEVSA also ignored well-supported observations by
Mozaffarian, et al. [103] (used in their submissions to high-
light that other food categories had a stronger association
with weight gain than SSBs) concerning the long-term
effects of modest increases in weight over time, which
worked against their efforts to highlight the minimal effect
the SSB tax would have on health incomes because of the
ostensibly small impact it was anticipated to have on daily
average energy intake (Table 5). Perhaps the most
egregious example concerned Coca-Cola’s (and BEVSA’s)
claim that “consumers typically substitute [d] SSBs with
other Calorie dense products”. This ignored assumptions
made by Oxford Economics in its 2016 report that “re-
search suggests negligible consumer switching into other
beverages and foods following the rise in the price of SSBs”
[58], which worked to inflate estimates of industry sup-
ported job losses and reduced tax revenue and GDP (see
Hyperbolic Accounting below).
This technique also extended to claims concerning the
economic impact of the policy. AmCham SA, for instance,
used the 2013 Oxford Economics report [73] to support
the claim that cross-border shopping had been “blamed
for the loss of 1,300 jobs” in Denmark (see Source Laun-
dering above) [71]. Immediately below it cited the Ecorys
report to support a separate point outlining the negative
effects of food taxes; ignoring Ecorys’ finding that the 30%
increase in cross-border shopping claimed by industry
stakeholders “was not confirmed in the Danish case study”
[79] (see Hyperbolic Accounting below).
Hyperbolic accounting
Hyperbolic accounting encompassed a range of inter-
dependent techniques, which cumulatively worked to
exaggerate the impact of SSB taxation on jobs, public rev-
enue generation, and gross domestic product (GDP). Esti-
mates of these impacts drew primarily on an economic
impact analysis of the soft drinks industry summarised in
Oxford Economics’ 2016 Report, whose own estimates
were derived by summating the policy’s direct (economic
activity supported by the core soft drinks industry), indirect
(economic activity generated by the core industry’s supply
chain, resulting from the procurement of domestically pro-
duced goods and services), induced (the wider economic ef-
fects of employees of the core soft drinks industry and its
supply chain spending their earnings) and distribution (for-
mal and informal retail, including spazas) impacts [58].
Some components of hyperbolic accounting, which we
refer to as acalculiac rounding-up and double-counting,
rested on simple misrepresentations of Oxford Economics’
estimates of impacts (simple misstatements of key find-
ings). Both BEVSA and Coca-Cola, for example, claimed
that the 2016 Oxford Economics report had estimated
that the tax could lead to 62,000–72,000 lost jobs [70, 72]
when it had, in fact, reported a range of between 60,600
and 70,700 potential job losses [58]. Likewise, after out-
lining Oxford Economics’ estimates for job losses,
Coca-Cola and BEVSA noted that this could lead to the
closure of between 8000 and 13,000 small retail outlets,
based on each spaza employing 2 people and projected
job losses of between 16,000 and 26,000 based on fig-
ures generated by Oxford Economics that included
both spaza and wider local and traditional trade [70,
Table 5 Strategic Ignorance
Text from Coca-Cola [70]
“Even by Treasury estimates, there will be very little impact, if any.
Research cited by the Treasury in its policy paper finds that, in the
central case, the proposed SSB tax will lower average energy
consumption by only 36 kJ (8.6 Calories) per day (0.3%), equivalent to
less than a quarter of an apple.”
Text from Mozaffarian, et al, 2011 [103]
“Average long-term weight gain in nonobese populations is gradual —
in the cohorts we studied, about 0.8 lb. (36 g) per year — but
accumulated over time, even modest increases in weight have
implications for long-term adiposity-related metabolic dysfunction,
diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and cancer [104–107].”
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72]. However, Oxford Economics had in fact estimated
that soft drinks sales could support between 13,400 and
23,500 fewer jobs in spaza stores following the tax, ex-
plicitly warning against adding spaza and local and
traditional jobs together due to the risk of overlap be-
tween datasets and double counting [58].
Other examples were more artful and rested on sub-
tle differences between how estimates were presented
in Oxford Economics’ 2016 report and industry submis-
sions. As indicated above, Oxford Economics’ projec-
tions of job losses and reductions in public revenue and
GDP were the outcome of an industry-focused eco-
nomic impact assessment. In contrast to policy-focused
impact assessments, where a dynamic, whole-of-econ-
omy approach is taken to modelling the widest conceiv-
able range of direct and indirect policy impacts, this
takes a relatively static approach to modelling impacts
proximate to the industry. Estimates were, therefore,
limited to numerically describing the policy’s effect on
the industry’s contribution to employment, government
revenue, and GDP and did not take account of how the
tax would displace economic activity to other parts of
the economy or improve productivity [108]. As such,
estimates of the effects of phenomena such as rede-
ployed consumer spending, which offset the more prox-
imate impacts of the tax [109], were not calculated.
Oxford Economics was explicit on this point, noting,
amongst other things, that calculations were on a “gross
basis” and, therefore, did not “account for redeploy-
ment of spending by consumers outside of the soft
drinks industry” [58] (see also Table 6, A1-A3). By con-
trast, BEVSA and Coca-Cola presented Oxford Eco-
nomics’ estimates as conditional policy impacts - effects
that would materialise provided its “least severe set of
assumptions” held true (Table 6, B1-B3, BEVSA only).
The natural inference to be drawn from quantifying the
social costs of job losses (Table 6, B1), or referring to
the “net impact on the fiscus” (Table 6, B2) or to pro-
viding categorical projections of reductions in GDP
(Table 6, B3), was that Oxford Economics had taken a
more comprehensive approach to modelling impacts
(false attribution of focus) and that its estimates related
to how the policy would affect jobs and gross value
added across the economy, and, therefore, net employ-
ment, revenue generation and GDP.
Syncopated estimation
We use syncopated estimation to describe Oxford Eco-
nomics’ practice of skipping steps in economic model-
ling (Table 1). The technique illustrates the challenges in
unscrambling hyperbolic accounting where industry ac-
tors enjoy a legitimate measure of discretion in making
assumptions relevant to predicting future consequences.
A mix of mutually reinforcing agnogenic practices were
used to justify assumptions about how consumers would
respond to SSB taxation, exploit gaps in the peer-
reviewed research on cross-price elasticities (see below)
and substitution effects, and ultimately provide a basis
for modelling complements (see below) that inflated
headline estimates and ignored substitutes that had
deflationary effects.
In brief, estimates produced within economic impact
assessments depend in large part on the type of assump-
tions made about future behaviour [110]: outwardly in-
nocuous choices over what eventualities get modelled
and how, can, potentially, have far-reaching effects on
final estimates (relating, in this case, to industry sup-
ported employment, tax revenue, and GDP). Ideally,
Table 6 Conflating Industry-Specific and Economy-Wide Effects
A1) Text from Oxford Economics (2016) on Jobs [58]
“The impact of the SSB tax on employment in spaza stores is based on
the revenue impact of the tax estimated for local and traditional stores.
This suggests that revenue from soft drinks sales could fall by around
22% in spaza stores due to the SSB tax. On that basis, soft drinks sales
could support between 13,400 and 23,500 fewer jobs in spaza stores
following the tax, depending on whether jobs are estimated based on
soft drinks’ share of revenue or margins.”
A2) Text from Oxford Economics (2016) on Public Revenue
Generation [58]
“We estimate that this reduction in economic activity could reduce the
industry’s contribution to tax revenues by R3.1 billion, including VAT due
to lower sales volumes.”
A3) Text from Oxford Economics (2016) on GDP [58]
“Once the multiplier impacts are considered, the contribution of the core
soft drinks industry to South Africa GDP could decline by R14 billion.”
B1) Text from BEVSA (2016) on Job Losses [72]
“The report from Oxford Economics (see Economic impact methodology
sidebar) estimates that the proposed SSB tax could result in the loss of
62,000–72,000 existing jobs (3400 direct, 25,200 upstream, and 15,400
induced job losses; combined with 19,000–29,000 downstream job
losses). The industry estimates that this will prevent the creation of 18,
000–28,000 planned new jobs over the next three years. The tax could
force the closure of 8000–13,000 small retail outlets and spaza shops …
..Standard approaches put the social cost of the increase in mortality,
due to the job losses caused by the SSB tax, at more than R1 billion.
This is in addition to the other social effects of unemployment, such as
increased violent crime.”
B2) Text from BEVSA (2016) on Public Revenue Generation [72]
“The report by Oxford Economics estimates that job losses and lower
industry profits could reduce Government revenues from its existing
taxes by at least R3.1 billion per annum. The Government could see
personal income taxes fall by R1.3 billion, corporate income taxes fall by
R1.1 billion, and VAT reduced by R0.8 billion. In addition, the tax would,
through its impact on unemployment, result in increased UIF payments
of approximately R0.7 billion, as well as additional (unquantified) costs
to the fiscus from secondary socio-economic effects of unemployment.
As a result, the net impact on the fiscus from the SSB tax could be 50%
lower than expectations.”
B3) Text from BEVSA (2016) on GDP [72]
“Using the least severe set of assumptions, the effects described above
could reduce South Africa’s GDP by R14 billion (R3.5 billion direct, R6.7
billion indirect, and R3.8 billion induced GDP contribution).”
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models should provide a spread of estimates represent-
ing different assumptions about how policies are likely
to take effect. Assumptions should take account of the
best available evidence and the range of assumptions
modelled should reflect the degree of uncertainty within
the evidence: the less developed or consistent the evi-
dence, the stronger the case for models to consider a
range of assumptions and the greater the range of mod-
elled estimates. The primary uncertainty in predicting
the impact of South Africa’s SSB tax on the soft drinks
industry centred on how the expected increase in SSB
prices might influence consumer demand for other
products manufactured by the industry, such as bottled
waters, flavoured and/or enhanced waters, ready-to-
drink teas and coffees, and dairy-based beverages [72].
In microeconomic modelling, changes in consumer
demand for products in response to a change in price of
another product are measured by cross-price elasticities.
Two products that are substitutes have a positive cross
elasticity of demand (as the price of SSB rises, the
demand for the other product also rises), whereas two
products that complement one another have a negative
cross elasticity of demand (as the price of SSB rises, the
demand for the other product falls). Modelling fewer
substituted products manufactured by the industry or
purposively selecting complements would, therefore,
serve to reduce the extent to which predicted consumer
choices offset the decline in SSB sales, inflating the pro-
jected impact of the tax on industry supported employ-
ment, tax revenue, and GDP.
In practice, Oxford Economics modelled for fruit juice
and diet drinks only [58]; using cross-price elasticities
reported in a 2014 analysis by Manyema, et al [111]
(hereafter just Manyema, et al), which drew on values
calculated in a 2013 meta-analysis of studies covering
the USA, France, Mexico and Brazil [112] (hereafter just
Cabrera Escobar, et al). Cabrera Escobar, et al had re-
ported a limited number of substitutes (fruit juice and
milk), and a negative cross-price elasticity for diet
drinks, which (in Oxford Economics’ modelling) offset
the extent to which substitution to fruit juice moderated
the predicted impact of reduced SBB consumption on
industry revenue. Although drawing on the results of a
meta-analysis suggested methodological rigour, relying
on Cabrera Escobar, et al for cross-price elasticities
effectively exploited fundamental differences in ap-
proaches to modelling health effects of SBB taxes where
excluding product substitutions considered less harmful
to health is not uncommon. Several studies reviewed by
Cabrera Escobar, et al, for example, had estimated cross-
price elasticities for other products, such as bottled
water [48, 113, 114] and tea and coffee [48, 113] (see
Additional file 1: Table S1). However, both these and
cross-price elasticities for other beverages, such as milk,
were omitted from their review as they contained “some
nutritional value” and “none of them contain [ed] sugar
added prior to packaging, so their relationship with
obesity [was] not as direct as it is for SSBs” [112]. More
to the point, Cabrera Escobar, et al represented a passé
source, which although fairly reflecting the state of scien-
tific knowledge when published had since been super-
seded by developments in the evidence-base. Research
on product substitutes and complements is a fast-devel-
oping area. Only two studies [113, 115] reviewed by
Cabrera Escobar, et al, for example, had estimated cross-
price elasticities for diet drinks. Notwithstanding con-
tinuing gaps in cross-price elasticities for beverages pro-
duced by the industry, subsequent studies have reported
positive values for diet drinks [90, 116] and bottled water
[116] (see Additional file 1: Table S1). Given the un-
developed state of the literature in 2013 (the year of
Cabrera Escobar, et al’s publication), ongoing inconsist-
encies in reported estimates for cross-price elasticities
(Additional file 1: Table S1), and the fact that reported
values vary geographically [80] and in response to differ-
ent methods of estimation [48], it was incumbent on
Oxford Economics to either generate their own esti-
mates for cross-price elasticities from South African
consumer panel data or to provide a range of estimates
based on different values for cross-price elasticities that
reflected the variation in the literature.
In the event, Oxford Economics produced categorical,
rather than a range of, estimates and made several at-
tendant observations that (outwardly) supported its ex-
clusive reliance on Cabrera Escobar, et al as a source of
cross-price elasticities. For example, it argued that using
Manyema et al (and, by implication, Cabrera Escobar, et
al) as a source of cross-price elasticities was necessary
“to ensure that the key assumptions underpinning [its]
work [were] consistent with those reported in the Na-
tional Treasury’s SSB tax policy paper” [58]. This im-
plied that the Treasury had used their findings to model
projected impacts of the tax. In fact, the Treasury’s pol-
icy paper contained no detailed modelling. Manyema, et
al was simply one of several studies cited to indicate the
potentially positive effects of an SSB tax on health out-
comes [56] and reference to the policy paper, as such,
represented little more than a faux source or appeal to a
false authority. Further, Oxford Economics claimed that
Manyema et al. had reported that, “drinkers of SSBs
[were] unlikely to switch to bottled water” and that
“other studies [had] not found statistically robust evi-
dence that people switch from SSBs to water when the
price of SSBs increase” [58]. In fact, Manyema, et al
make no reference to bottled water (simple misstatement
of study findings). Moreover, whilst some studies had
found no evidence of substitution to water (see Additional
file 1: Table S1), many other studies (prior to 2016) had.
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This was reflected in Manyema, et al’s observation that,
“other studies have shown that the demand for tea and
coffee, as well as water goes up with SSB price increases”,
which cited a 2013 study [90] published in the British
Medical Journal in support that Oxford Economics had
also cited to make a separate point (strategic ignorance).
Information asymmetries, inaccessible data and black box
computation
Finally, the scope for hyperbolic accounting was enabled by
reliance on privately held data in economic assessments
(inaccessible data) and opaque, unverifiable steps in eco-
nomic modelling (black box computation). Although not
strictly agnogenic practices, both phenomena increase the
obstacles involved in substantiating the bona fides of in-
dustry estimates of projected economic impacts and, as
such, expand the opportunities for corporate agnogenesis.
For example, Oxford Economics’ estimates of lost spaza
jobs and store closures rested on the assumption that post-
tax employment would fall in proportion to the decline in
revenue generated by soft drink sales. Its projections were,
therefore, tied to baseline estimates for both employment
and store numbers and the proportion of spaza revenue
(and profit margins) derived from SSB sales. In relation to
the former, estimates for both employment and store num-
bers drew on unpublished, industry-funded research by
PwC [117] and “consultation with industry” [58], which
had the effect of increasing PwC’s original estimate of 150,
000 “small business enterprises” and 300,000 workers to
180,000 stores, employing 360,000 people [58]. Likewise,
revenue estimates were based on unpublished industry sur-
veys, which suggested that approximately 17% of store
turnover (30% of retail margin) was attributable to soft
drink sales. On first examination, black box computation in
Oxford Economics’ report appeared relatively trivial and
was partly eclipsed by the inclusion of appendences that
provided clear summaries of both its economic impact
methodology and approach to estimating the impact of the
SSB tax on the economic footprint of the soft drinks indus-
try in appendices to its report. Nonetheless, various figures
and values were effectively asserted without adequate ex-
planations of their provenance which were key to Oxford
Economics’ final estimates. For instance, Oxford Econom-
ics’ simply noted that its “modelling suggests that the core
industry paid R1.8 billion in corporation tax and almost
R1.1 billion in income tax payments”, without providing ei-
ther the data underlying or method of its calculations.
Equally, the report noted that, “[u] sing industry specific
productivity estimates derived from Statistics South Africa
data and published by Oxford Economics the core industry
[was] estimated to support around 107,500 jobs indirectly
and a further 66,500 via the induced impact channel”
without outlining how they had been derived [58].
Finally, focusing exclusively on information asymmetries
in respect of Oxford Economics’ estimates belies the true
extent of the problem in corporate submissions. Some
sources (e.g. Oxford Economics’ 2013 report, which was
drawn on heavily by AmCham SA) referred to directly in
corporate submissions to support other points, for
example, were not publicly available either during the con-
sultation period or at the time of writing. The same applied
to other sources that underpinned claims in cited refer-
ences (e.g the survey by the Danish Grocer’s Trade Organ-
isation - see under Cryptic Referencing).
Modelling corporate agnogenesis in the soft drinks
industry
Figure 1 depicts the above findings and seeks to illus-
trate how the industry’s agnogenic techniques relate to
one another.
Some techniques and practices identified in our data
overlap with those outlined in Ulucanlar et al’s study of
the tobacco industry: notably, the tweezers method, the
conflation of absence of evidence with evidence of ab-
sence, and evidential landscaping [5]. The industry’s use
of logical fallacies and its practice of cherry-picking also
highlight commonalities with denialism [99, 118]. Fur-
ther, some examples of cherry-picked evidence (see the
discussion of Fletcher, et al under Observational Selec-
tion above) have the effect of “wholesale discounting of
evidence” [5] also reported in Ulucanlar et al’s study.
In addition, the model outlines four qualities of cor-
porate agnogenesis that illustrate its plasticity and the
interdependence between different techniques and prac-
tices. First, different techniques can produce the same
effect. Both the tweezers method and false attribution of
focus, for example, were used to conflate absence of evi-
dence with evidence of absence. Second, the same tech-
nique can be used to produce different effects. Out-of-
place citations, for example, were used to support illicit
generalisations and misleading summaries. Third, agno-
genic techniques can operate as a series of steps in a
process or a chain of agnogenesis. For instance, key
qualifying information was omitted from studies which
worked to misrepresent their focus and objectives and,
ultimately, provided a platform to present contradictory
findings on the extent to which food taxes led to improve-
ments in health (an absence of consistent evidence) as evi-
dence that the research had found no improvements
(evidence of absence). Fourth, agnogenic techniques can
also combine in more complex ways. Coca-Cola’s and
BEVSA’s practice of cherry-picking studies to support
their preferred theory of substitution effects, for example,
rested on an illicit generalisation and relied heavily on se-
lective quoting and the omission of qualifying information
of the selected studies, as well as strategic ignorance of the
findings and observations in studies relied on elsewhere in
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their submissions. In this respect, agnogenesis is produced
via a mutually reinforcing network of agnogenic techniques
that produce superficially coherent descriptions of evi-
dence that support the industry’s overarching dystopic
narrative.
Finally, account needs to be taken of the different roles
that agnogenic practices perform in corporate evidence
claims. Some, such as selective quotations, for example,
constitute classic agnogenic techniques in so far as they
misrepresent the underlying evidence. Others, however,
such as cryptic references, inaccessible data and black
box computation perform a more ancillary role: not mis-
leading in themselves, but, nonetheless, potentially in-
strumental to more direct agnogenic practices in so far
as they work to obstruct evidence appraisal. Equally,
strategic ignorance is neither strictly misleading (al-
though it may be) nor obstructive of evidence appraisal.
However, it represents a necessary strategy in building
agnogenic narratives where the weight of evidence
suggests a policy is broadly likely to work as intended.
Discussion
Corporate agnogenesis represents a major problem for
health actors and the general population. Addressing the
global non-communicable disease epidemic requires fun-
damental changes in markets: what products are sold, at
what price, how and to whom [119]. It sets publics and
health professionals against transnational corporations in
what are partly ideational [120] and partly evidence-based
policy conflicts that must take account of what works and
at what costs. In this respect, agnogenic practices need to
be understood both as political techniques in their own
right and as components of other political techniques
[121–123], such as direct lobbying and constituency build-
ing, where the communication of evidence-based informa-
tion is instrumental to framing issues [69].
This political potential of corporate agnogenesis has
been strengthened by the emergence of new forms of
policy-making governance, which draw heavily on the
US cost-benefit approach to policy formation. These
new forms of governance have elevated the importance
of evidence in areas of policy-making in which corporate
and public interests clash and enhanced the effective
political power of economics which has created a recep-
tive milieu for industry commissioned economic impact
analyses that translate diverse and complex processes
into a single figure with the sense of precision and neu-
trality widely accorded to numbers [124]. Providing sup-
port for both health and economic-related claims,
engaging with the peer-reviewed literature, and present-
ing economic estimates with the appearance of a sound
theoretical basis, establishes a right to be heard and
taken seriously. Corporate agnogenesis then goes on to
exploit the uncertainties inherent in both scientific
norms and practices and economic modelling that this
right of policy engagement affords.
These uncertainties highlight the structural vulnerabil-
ity of modern modes of evidence-based policy-making to
corporate agnogenesis. Scientific uncertainty arises in
part because new evidence is constantly emerging and
because new methods are regularly developed to gather
and analyse evidence. No scientific claim is entirely free
from evidential challenge [125, 126]. Corporations also,
in effect, leverage the culture of criticism that scientists
seek to cultivate, which involves pointing out where
other scientists have overstated their findings, or missed
important things, and developing alternative explana-
tions of the evidence [6, 127–130]. In the present case,
these characteristics of scientific uncertainty are exem-
plified by the research on cross-price elasticities, where
relatively large variations in values persist and different
methodological approaches have produced conflicting
findings on substitution effects. Both were exploited in
industry submissions. By contrast, the agnogenic risks
inherent in industry economic modelling arise from the
conceit underlying estimates that appear to render the
future knowable and calculable. In practice, each as-
sumption and step in the modelling process provides a
further opportunity to inflate the projected costs of pub-
lic health policies. The potential agnogenic effect is com-
pounded by a lack of clarity in how data sources have
been produced, and by mishandling inconsistencies and
gaps in the scientific literature. The industry’s produc-
tion of categorical estimates for economic impacts, as
opposed to a range, simply reflects the political (and
therefore commercial) peril in embracing uncertainty,
which, inevitably, would lead to less conclusive outputs
and lower estimates of effects. Consequently, estimates
of impacts are precise, but not necessarily accurate, a
subtle artefact of cumulative overstatement that pro-
duces precision from imprecision. The risk to evidence
informed policy-making is that headline estimates, rather
than the questionable and indiscernible assumptions that
underpin them have the greater salience, and mnemonic
potential.
Structural weaknesses inherent in contemporary forms
of evidence-based policy-making are exacerbated by
diagnostic problems in unpicking corporate agnogenic
techniques. On first inspection, these appear to be soft-
ened by broad similarities between agnogenic techniques
identified in studies of corporations’ use of evidence in
different sectors, which is providing an emerging inven-
tory of sharp evidential practices [5]. Despite this, the
way in which identical practices manifest themselves in
different evidential and policy contexts is necessarily
unique and not only requires careful appraisal of the
specific evidence upon which they profess to be based,
but also knowledge of the broader evidential context in
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which they are set. In addition, while singular, agnogenic
techniques do not work to create doubt in isolation, but
rather work in chains and networks of agnogenic logic.
This layered quality of agnogenesis produces an osten-
sibly coherent, evidence-based analysis, which, when
combined with other techniques, such as confounding ref-
erences, that directly inhibit evidence appraisal, work to
intensify the difficulties of detection. Finally, these difficul-
ties are compounded by agnogenic techniques that use
evidence widely regarded as high quality. Observational
selection (cherry-picking), selective quotations, the false
attribution of focus, and the tweezers method, for in-
stance, typically involved peer-reviewed studies. Evaluating
the strength and validity of the evidence in industry sub-
missions, as such, cannot be simply divined by examining
the quality of evidence cited or funding sources which by-
passes the conceit underlying agnogenesis: its mimicry of
the core commitment to evidence-based reasoning within
scientific norms and practices.
Conclusions
The policy implications of our findings need to be set
against the spread internationally of regulatory impact
assessments and mandatory public consultations
through Better Regulation/Good Governance agenda
[131] (and their equivalents) and contemporary trade
and investment agreements [3]. By prescribing a right to
submit evidence and embedding cost-benefit analysis
within policy-making, these formalise opportunities for
corporate agnogenesis and the political potential of in-
dustry-funded economic modelling. That these policy in-
struments work in the interests of corporate actors is
consistent with calls from BEVSA and Coca-Cola for the
South African government to undertake a full socio-eco-
nomic impact assessment of the policy, in consultation
with the industry [70, 72].
Further, our findings not only highlight the value of im-
proving the transparency and scrutiny of regulatory impact
assessments and consultations in health policy-making, but
also other modes of industry political activity. In the
present context, for example, the findings of industry
commissioned research, including the 2016 Oxford Eco-
nomics report, for example, were cited in stakeholder
workshops organised by the National Treasury [132]. In
addition, the fact that some of the practices and techniques
outlined above have been used in various, policy-related
contexts (by, for example, actors linked to the tobacco [5,
118, 133], alcohol [34, 39], fossil fuel [31, 99, 118, 130,
134], chemical [37] and agrochemical industries [37]) high-
lights both the relevance of our work to other policy fields
and the importance of ensuring full transparency across all
areas of policy-making where corporate interests run-up
against broader public interests. Full transparency would
involve publication of all industry submissions to
consultations and verbatim transcripts of workshops, cor-
respondence and meetings between industry actors and of-
ficials, and should be formalised within the context of
“policy footprints”. These represent a real-time record of
lobbyists’ influence on policy, which mandate disclosure of
all contacts and correspondence with officials, minutes of
meetings, and any supporting materials relied on or pro-
vided by lobbyists in the course of policy development
[135, 136]. Comprehensive policy footprints represent
one of several reforms necessary to meet the recom-
mendation of the recent Lancet Commission on
Obesity, Undernutrition and Climate [137] for the
introduction of an international agreement to address
conflicts of interest in food policy. However, transpar-
ency alone is unlikely to be enough to manage the ef-
fects of corporate agnogenesis in health policy, given
the difficulties in unpicking how it takes effect. In
addition, efforts need to be made to enhance ap-
praisal of industry use of evidence. Ideally, there
should be a presumption in favour of in-depth critical
appraisal, organised and financially supported by na-
tional governments. Beyond this, there is a strong case
for closer transnational collaboration between civil so-
ciety actors and academics that centres on producing
real-time appraisals of companies’ use of evidence in
both public consultations and other contexts in which
they provide information to policy actors and the
public.
Given the policy risks associated with corporate agno-
genesis there is a need for further, in-depth research on
corporations’ use of evidence in different policy areas
relevant to public health (e.g. climate change, environ-
mental health, occupational health, alcohol, agrochemi-
cals, and gambling), as well as in respect of different
polices relevant to diet-related diseases (e.g. restrictions
on marketing to children). More generally, our findings
point to the importance of further research on the polit-
ical-psychology of corporate agnogenesis. The obvious
explanation for corporate agnogenesis is that it repre-
sents a necessary protective strategy for business actors
where the evidence-base necessary to contest commer-
cially prejudicial policies is weak or unhelpful. However,
submissions were characterised by a form of kettle logic,
a term coined to describe the use of multiple, contra-
dictory arguments to support a single point [138], which
reflected the legalistic style of corporate submissions
where efforts to raise every conceivable objection to a
policy and the evidence supporting it led to industry ac-
tors taking positions that appeared credible when viewed
in isolation, but which were, in fact, confused and
contradictory when viewed collectively. In its most basic
form, this involved industry actors claiming that SSB
taxation would not generate the revenue projected, not
affect consumption because consumers would merely
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accept the tax, and lead to catastrophic job losses and
business closures [71]. In our view, this elemental flaw
in industry submissions merits further examination of
the thinking underlying discrete cases of corporate agno-
genesis, which combines the conceptual tools of political
economy and organisational psychology. Finally, further
research is required to explore the effects of corporate
agnogenesis on the perceptions of policy actors and
publics.
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